This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MAPUTO 000374

¶1. Post has reviewed its last report (Ref B) and made several
changes to the Security Environmental Profile Questionnaire
(SEPQ), reflected in the following answers:

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

¶1. (U) DEMONSTRATIONS:

¶A. Yes
¶B. No
¶C. No
¶D. For 2004, N/A.
¶E. For 2004, N/A. For 2003, reported demonstrations were
triggered by specific U.S. foreign policy or military events.
¶F. Peaceful
¶G. N/A
¶H. N/A
¶I. No.
¶J. Yes. In February, 2004, 150-200 employees of Wackenhut,
the company that has the local guard contract, demonstrated
about a severance pay discrepancy in a park one block from
the embassy and a portion of this group attempted to approach
the embassy later in the day only to be turned away by
Diplomatic Police. In July, 2004, 41 Mozambicans occupied
the German Embassy for four days due to a conflict involving
government pensions. The German Embassy is located less than
one block from the U.S. Embassy.
¶K. 100-150 people
¶L. Peaceful
¶M. N/A
?

¶2. (U) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS

¶A. No
¶B. N/A
¶C. N/A
¶D. N/A
?

¶3. (S/NF) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES

¶A. No
¶B. No, not directly. However, some National Police and
prosecutors in the Attorney General's Office have received
training from the USG supported International Law Enforcement
Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone, Botswana and in the United
States. The Mozambican Police Academy (ACIPOL) has received
funding and training for its drug laboratory.
¶C. Yes
¶D. No. Mozambican State Security and Intelligence Service
(SISE) is professional and reactive when presented with
information but due to limited funds and resources SISE is
unable to effectively deter terrorist actions.
¶E. Yes
¶F. No
¶G. Yes. The National Police currently provides static
police guards (six at the Embassy, two at U.S.AID, one at
Public Diplomacy, and one at the Ambassador's residence).
Since 9/11, Rapid Intervention Police maintains postings at
the Embassy, Public Diplomacy, and the Ambassador's
Residence. Embassy Maputo provides meals and a monthly
stipend to these police in order to ensure consistent police
support. The police are poorly trained and act more as a
deterrent to any potential threats than as an actual
safeguard.
¶H. Poor. Security at the major airport is inconsistent at
best. On any given day, the airport perimeter may be left
unattended.
¶I. Ineffective. Immigration and customs controls at the
border points and crossings are vulnerable to exploitation by
criminals and extremists, due to meager salaries, lack of
training for officers, and an underdeveloped security
infrastructure. Computers are present at two major points of
entry, Ressano Garcia and Maputo's international airport, but
there is no comprehensive networked system.
¶J. Ineffective. Outside of formal crossing points, security
along Mozambique's vast land borders with neighboring
countries (South Africa, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi

and Tanzania) is poor, as is maritime security. There is no
Navy, Coast Guard, or Border Patrol present in Mozambique to
serve in this capacity. Unfortunately, the Government of
Mozambique does not have the resources to control its borders
effectively.
?

INDIGENOUS TERRORISM

¶4. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS

¶A. Unknown
¶B. N/A
¶C. N/A
¶D. N/A
¶E. N/A
¶F. N/A
¶G. N/A
¶H. N/A
?

¶5. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS

¶A. Unknown
¶B. N/A
¶C. N/A
¶D. N/A
¶E. N/A
?

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

¶6. (SBU) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS

¶A. Unknown.
¶B. N/A
¶C. N/A
¶D. Unknown
¶E. Yes. Elements of the small expatriate south Asian Muslim
community are sympathetic to transnational terrorist groups
as mentioned in the previous reports.
¶F. Low.
¶G. Very high.
?
?
LALIME